Building Scalable Group Messaging with MLS (Message Layer Security)
⚠️ WARNING: This document is not finished. The details in this document are subject to change.
End-to-end encrypted messaging for two people is a solved problem—Signal Protocol has set the gold standard. But what happens when you want to scale that security to group chats with dozens or hundreds of participants? Traditional pairwise encryption becomes a nightmare: N participants require N(N-1)/2 encrypted channels, each with its own key management overhead.
Enter MLS (Message Layer Security), the IETF's RFC 9420 standard designed specifically for scalable group messaging. MLS provides the same strong security guarantees as Signal Protocol—forward secrecy, post-compromise security, authentication—but does so efficiently for groups of any size.
In this article, we'll explore how MLS works, why it's a game-changer for group messaging, and walk through a complete browser-based implementation using the ts-mls library. We'll cover everything from the TreeKEM algorithm to practical P2P integration with WebRTC.
Introduction to MLS
Message Layer Security (MLS) is a cryptographic protocol designed to provide end-to-end encryption for group messaging at scale. Published as RFC 9420 by the IETF in July 2023, MLS represents years of cryptographic research and real-world testing.
What Makes MLS Special?
Unlike traditional approaches to group messaging, MLS is built from the ground up for efficiency and security:
🔐 End-to-End Encryption
- Messages encrypted on sender's device, decrypted only on recipients' devices
- No server can read message contents
- Same security level as Signal Protocol, but for groups
⚡ Scalable Key Management
- Logarithmic complexity for key updates: O(log N) instead of O(N)
- 100-person group? Only ~7 operations instead of 100
- 1000-person group? Only ~10 operations instead of 1000
🔄 Forward Secrecy
- Compromise of today's keys doesn't reveal yesterday's messages
- Automatic key rotation with each message
- Protection even if long-term identity keys are leaked
🛡️ Post-Compromise Security
- System "heals" from key compromise
- New Diffie-Hellman exchanges generate fresh key material
- Attacker loses access after compromise ends
✅ Asynchronous Operations
- Members can join groups while offline
- No requirement for all participants to be online simultaneously
- Server-based key package distribution
MLS vs Signal Protocol
| Feature | Signal Protocol | MLS Protocol |
|---|---|---|
| Use Case | 1:1 messaging | Group messaging |
| Participants | 2 | 2 to thousands |
| Key Update Complexity | O(1) | O(log N) |
| Algorithm | Double Ratchet | TreeKEM |
| Key Structure | Chain keys | Binary tree |
| Asynchronous | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes |
| Forward Secrecy | ✅ Yes | ✅ Yes |
| Post-Compromise Security |
